Husserl Studies 2: 267-290 (1985).
© 1985 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht. Printed in the Netherlands.

An early interpretation of Husserl's phenomenology: Johannes Daubert and the *Logical Investigations**

REINHOLD N. SMID
Universität Köln

1. Daubert and the early reception of the *Logical Investigations*

1.1 *Two testimonies on Daubert and the "Logical Investigations"*

Johannes Daubert (1877-1947) did not publish anything in his lifetime. Because of this, Max Scheler called him an "unknown phenomenologist".[1] All we have are his posthumous papers, which are deposited in the Bavarian State Library in Munich.[2] But some of his activities were reported by other phenomenologists. Here, I want to quote just two of these testimonies. In the summer terms of 1902 Daubert visited Edmund Husserl in Göttingen in order to discuss the *Logical Investigations* with him. After a few hours Husserl exclaimed, "Here is someone who has read and really understood my Logical Investigations!"[3] As Herbert Spiegelberg points out, "This conversation was easily the most important single event in the history of the Munich Phenomenological Circle."[4] Husserl's appreciation of Daubert appears even more remarkable when we consider that Daubert did not study under him, but under Theodor Lipps in Munich. There Daubert began to familiarize the circle of Lipps' students, among them Pfänder, Geiger, Reinach, Gallinger, and Conrad, with Husserl's *Logical Investigations*. In 1933, Moritz Geiger wrote concerning Pfänder: "When the

* This paper was first presented at the 15th Annual Meeting of the Husserl Circle at Emory University Atlanta, Georgia on 3 June 1983. I would like to thank Professor Herbert Spiegelberg, Washington University, for his detailed comments on my paper, the participants of the Husserl Circle for their critical remarks which I integrated into this version, Professor William McKenna, Miami University, and Mr. Kenneth L. Heiges, Emory University, for reading and correcting the reworked version of this paper.

second volume of Husserl's 'Logical Investigations' appeared a few year years later, Pfänder was introduced to it by Johannes Daubert (by that thinker who, without having published a line, contributed more towards the 'Logical Investigations' becoming known than did anyone else). Pfänder found here a congenial approach."[5] With this, Geiger not only lays stress upon Daubert's intimate knowledge of the *Logical Investigations*, but also points to Pfänder's independence as a phenomnologist. But this does not mean that Daubert had been prepared for the reception of the *Logical Investigations* by Pfänder's own phenomenology. Both Pfänder's as well as Daubert's phenomenology are rooted in the thinking of their teacher, Theodor Lipps.

1.2 *Theodor Lipps, a source of independent phenomenologizing in Munich*

Beginning with the winter term of 1898/99 Daubert studied in Munich, mainly under Lipps. There he took notes on Lipps' lectures on psychology of the summer term of 1900. On 17 July, he wrote in his notes, "[Some] phenomenological [themes] are: 1) objective contents of consciousness and spatial-temporal relations, 2) the Ego, 3) the relations of objective content of consciousness to the psyche."[6] In the same year Lipps dealt with these themes in a modified form in his article "*Psychische Vorgänge und psychische Causalität*" (Psychic Processes and Psychic Causality), where he termed his methodical procedure "purely phenomenological" (*rein phänomenologisch*).[7] Lipps understands by "purely phenomenological" the unprejudiced description of contents of consciousness. According to Lipps, phenomenology puts psychology and philosophy on a new basis. Furthermore, the phenomenological method serves to separate the psychical and the physical. The relationship to the Ego also belongs to Lipps' phenomenological concept of the psychic. This differs from Husserl for whom, in his *Logical Investigations*, the Ego was an object comparable to other real objects. The Ego which experiences the world is the immediately experienced Ego or Ego which feels (*Gefühls-Ich*). Lipps contrasts this real Ego with the pure Ego (*das reine Ich*), which he identifies with what he calls the "*Vernunft-Ich*". The pure Ego is, in his terms, the base for "the comprehensive phenomenology of spirit".[8]

Lipps' own phenomenology has not been fully explored as yet.[9] But

his 'psychologism' is well known. In 1902, Lipps expressly rejected psychologism.[10] Nevertheless, his own students continued to regard him as a psychologistic thinker. This especially applies in the case of Johannes Daubert.

1.3 *The reception of the "Logical Investigations" in Munich in historical sequence*

In July 1902, about a month after his first visit to Husserl in Göttingen, Daubert gave a lecture "On the Psychology of Apperception and Judgment" (*Zur Psychologie der Apperzeption und des Urteils*)[11] at the "Academic Association for Psychology" (*Akademischer Verein für Psychologie*) in Munich. This was an organization of Lipps' students which was of special importance for the development of phenomenology in Munich. In this lecture, references to Lipps' as well as to Husserl's phenomenology can be found. As far as I know, it is the first public discussion of Husserl in Munich. In his lecture, Daubert took up the issue of the "conflict between logicians and psychologists" (4/2r, cf. 4/15r) concerning the relation of the act of judging and the judgment itself. Apparently, this formulation relates to Melchior Palágyi's book *Der Streit der Psychologisten und Formalisten in der modernen Logik* (*The Dispute between Psychologists and Formalists in Modern Logic*).[12] Daubert differentiated the act of judgment as apperception from the apperception of an object. It should be noted that the Munich phenomenologists influenced by Lipps had a very broad concept of apperception whereby it covered any consciousness of any objects whatever. In the act of judgment objects are only mediately given. Daubert first utilized Lipps' concept of apperception, only to reject it later. He appealed to Lipps' concept of the "purely phenomenological" in order to distinguish acts, as well as to Husserl's idea of "phenomenological clarification". He too emphasized the distinction between the act of judgment and the ideal signification of the judgment, which is entirely in accord with Husserl's mode of thinking. Husserl's distinctions between the various concepts of content were also presented (cf. LU II, pp. 50 ff. and pp. 374 ff.). Although Daubert sometimes mentioned Husserl, the *Logical Investigations* were never named by title. This implies that the audience was at least superficially acquainted with this work. Husserl's distinctions are, one year after the appearance of LU, "self-evident" (4/14r) for Daubert. The "conflict between psychologists and logicians" is presented as a conflict between Lipps' psychology of apperception and Husserl's phenomenology understood as a doctrine

of essences of judgment. Daubert settled this dispute by confronting the ideality of signification according to Husserl with the psychic act of judgment. Daubert's lecture at the Psychological Association meeting of July 1902 is also noteworthy for another reason. One year later Husserl himself, in his review of Palágyi's publication, was to point out the fundamental distinction between the act of judgment and the ideality of signification (cf. Hua XXII, 152 ff.). So it can be said Daubert had anticipated Husserl in this regard.

For Daubert, the study of the *Logical Investigations* was a "*Stahlbad*" ("philosophical tonic bath"), as Spiegelberg reported, quoting an oral communication of August Gallinger.[13] On 8 December 1903, Lipps wrote to Husserl: "By and large, it seems to me we concur in the essentials. I can only sometimes and with difficulty reconcile myself to your terminology. It seems to me that it could be simpler. Occasionally, it is even too psychologistic for me. I once said, half jokingly, half seriously – to some of my more serious students, who are very intensively studying your *Logical Investigations* – that one of them should write a polemical piece against you entitled 'Husserl's Psychologism'."[14] It is very likely that Daubert was one of those to whom Lipps made this proposal. From this we can see that the *Logical Investigations* were read rather critically in Munich.

On 27 May 1904, Husserl gave a lecture at the Munich Psychological Association, which Daubert had arranged.[15] Hans Büttner, a student of Pfänder in the thirties, stated, unfortunately without mentioning the sources he used, "Husserl himself confessed that it was only as a result of his meeting with this circle that he clearly came to realize what was genuinely new in his approach."[16] Between 14 and 25 July 1904, Husserl wrote to Pfänder recommending that he study the *Logical Investigations*.[17] Still in the same year Pfänder prepared excerpts of the work. In the next year he drafted a manuscript dealing with it, which was probably intended for publication.[18] Also in 1904, Aloys Fischer submitted his doctoral dissertation *Über symbolische Relationen* (*On Symbolic Relations*), which was published only a year later. This is the first Munich dissertation citing the *Logical Investigations*. In 1906, the Munich philosopher Hans Cornelius admitted having just then finished "the gruelling job of studying Husserl's book".[19]

In the same year, the reaction of the Munich phenomenologist Moritz Geiger to the *Logical Investigations* can be ascertained from his *Habilitationsschrift* entitled *Methodological and Experimental Contri-*

butions to the Theory of Quantity. In his dissertation *Bemerkungen zur Psychologie der Gefühlselemente und Gefühlsverbindungen* (*Remarks on the Psychology of Elementary and Complex Feelings*) of 1904, there are as yet no references to Husserl. Geiger's concept of phenomenology still moves along Lippsian lines.[20] In his *Habilitationsschrift*, however, Geiger contrasts his "a priori phenomenology of objects" with Husserl's "phenomenology of acts" and explains that both are of equal value.[21] By saying this, Geiger intended to preserve his independence from Husserl just as the other Munich phenomenologists did.

In Reinach's dissertation *Über den Ursachenbegriff im geltenden Strafrecht* (*On the Concept of Causality in Criminal Law*), published in 1905, there are no traces of Husserl. Admittedly, his topic does not seem to demand them. In a letter to Conrad of 16 January 1905, Reinach writes that he has reread the second part of the *Logical Investigations* and is delighted with it.[22] In the summer term of 1905, he and Daubert studied under Husserl in Göttingen (see 2.2). We can corroborate Reinach's knowledge of the *Logical Investigations* on the basis of Daubert's notes of his conversations with Reinach and Husserl (cf. 5/95r). In the early part of 1907, Theodor Conrad asked Daubert what he should take into consideration when going to study under Husserl in Göttingen in the summer term of the same year. Daubert replied in a voluminous letter of 22 March 1907, and described to Conrad Husserl's difficulties in understanding unfamiliar trains of thought. He also advised Conrad to study the *Logical Investigations*, because this would facilitate his contact with Husserl. Moreover, Daubert wrote that since 1902 Munich had been "infected (*durchseucht*) with Husserl's ideas".[23] This remark of Daubert's is ambiguous. On the one hand, it indicates how well Husserl was known in Munich, but on the other hand, it shows that a certain distance from him was being taken. Also in 1907, in a letter to Conrad, Reinach quotes Daubert's statement to the effect that one can doubt whether phenomenology in Munich originated from Husserl.[24]

In light of this development, it becomes clear Husserl did not come to be well known in Munich overnight, and that Munich Phenomenology always kept its independence from Husserl. Daubert's reactions to the *Logical Investigations*, to which we now turn, bears testimony to this fact. And we should here consider that, according to Herbert Spiegelberg, Daubert was "perhaps the most influential member of the Munich Circle".[25]

1.4 *Daubert and the "Logical Investigations"*

The main sources of our knowledge concerning Daubert's understanding of the *Logical Investigations* are his personal copy and the fifth file of his posthumous papers entitled "Husserl. Meinong". Daubert had annotated his copy extensively. The annotations exhibit simple marks, signs, and critical comments. Different levels of Daubert's discussion of Husserl are noticed here. From this, the following sequence of Daubert's work on the *Logical Investigations* can be established:

1. Reading of the *Logical Investigations* and markings without comments: this was towards the end of 1901 at the earliest, but probably in the Spring of 1902 (preparing the meeting with Husserl in Göttingen).
2. Early excerpts, partially corresponding to the annotations in his personal copy: Summer of 1902 until the beginning of 1903. Thematical priorities were the First, Third, Fifth, and Sixth Investigations.
3. Critical comments in his copy and critical analysis of the work, especially of the First, Fifth, and Sixth Investigations: from the Summer of 1903.

Within this third phase one can note these further stages of the LU-discussion: a. conversations with Husserl from 1904. Crucial points were: the concept of object, the problems of evidence, empathy, and questions. b. On 28 December 1904, Daubert wrote an extensive letter to Fritz Weinmann about the problem of questions in the *Logical Investigations* (see 2.5). c. In the summer term of 1905 Daubert, along with the Lipps' students Adolf Reinach, Alfred Schwenninger, and Fritz Weinmann, studied under Husserl in Göttingen. This was the famous "Munich invasion of Göttingen".[26] It was probably during this term that Daubert wrote the undated manuscripts entitled "*On the Revision of the Logical Investigations*". Crucial points were once more the concept of object and the problems of evidence. In February 1905, Husserl wrote in a draft of a letter to Walter Pitkin, who intended to translate the *Logical Investigations* into English, that for this purpose he wanted to subject the *Logical Investigations* to a "revision".[27] Daubert was almost certainly inspired by Husserl's own plan for a revision to compose his manuscripts on the revision of the *Logical Investigations*. Husserl's plan was not realized, because an English translation did not appear

owing to adverse circumstances. Daubert obviously wrote these manuscripts at a stage when it was still uncertain whether Husserl's revision of the *Logical Investigations* would be published.

Husserl's appreciation of Daubert was so great that he even made the recommendation to his own teacher, Franz Brentano, to have Daubert explain the *Logical Investigations* to him. Husserl had first tried by letter to explain the aims of his work to Brentano, but did not succeed.[28] In March 1907, during his visit to Brentano, Husserl's endeavors once again failed. It was on this occasion that he seems to have referred Brentano to Daubert. In July 1907, Brentano did in fact meet twice with Daubert in Munich; they discussed what Husserl had intended in the *Logical Investigations*, and especially what he understood by psychologism. Daubert clarified Husserl's concept of psychologism, with which Brentano agreed. Brentano, however, could not make sense of the idea "that there should be a sort of Being that is not temporal".[29] Daubert then explained the nature of categorial intuition. But they did not come to an agreement on that either. Yet one gets the impression that Brentano learnt more about the *Logical Investigations* through his conversations with Daubert than from those with Husserl.

In 1911, Husserl revived his earlier plan for a revision of the *Logical Investigations*. It is symptomatic that Daubert seems to have been the first one whom Husserl informed about this. In 1913, at Husserl's initiation they spent the holidays together again and discussed the Sixth Investigation.[30]

2. Daubert as an interpreter of the *Logical Investigations*

2.1 *Phenomenological similarities*

Husserl's and Daubert's phenomenologies have a common starting point. According to both it is the task of phenomenology to describe phenomena, i.e. the experiences of consciousness, without any prejudice. Phenomena are to be grasped in their essence. Inquiry into essence does not only relate to empirical states of affairs, but also to universal, i.e. categorical objects. Perception, or more exactly intuition, encompasses the domains of reality and ideality. Viewing (*Schauen*) is the method of phenomenology. We grasp objects through acts which are consciousness-of-something. Daubert took over

the concepts of act and intentionality from Husserl, but at the same time he also criticized Husserl in this regard (see 2.5 and 2.6). Acts form the basis of phenomenology. Thus, for both Husserl and Daubert, phenomenology is not simply one philosophical method among others; rather, it is aimed at making philosophy scientific. In a manner similar to Husserl's, Daubert asked in one of his manuscripts, "*How is Phenomenology as Science Possible?*" (1/37r); he replied that phenomenology can only fulfill this task as a doctrine of phenomena. Phenomenology has as its theme the *a priori*. Phenomenology becomes the foundation of all other sciences. It inquires into the foundations of knowledge and cognition. It starts from "matters" as "things-given-in-themselves". In the following it will become clear that Daubert took up Husserl's main modes of inquiry and analyzed them in term of Husserl's concepts, but to a certain degree he achieved other results. Daubert's main objection to Husserl's phenomenology was that it contains ambiguities and contradictions. He intended to point them out and to avoid them. Furthermore, on this basis he developed an independent conception of phenomenology and also a criticism of other philosophers. The focal point in Daubert's interpretation of the *Logical Investigations* was the concept of object.

2.2 *The concept of object*

Daubert chose Husserl's distinction between "the *object just as it is intended*, and the *object* simply *which* is intended" (LU II, p. 376) as the point of departure of his analyses of Husserl's concept of object. The object *which* is intended persists as an identical something. The object considered just as it is intended always shows itself in other relations. These "determinations of the object" (5/81v) contain the following moments:

"1. The object's traits, more or less completely thought,
2. its relations to other objects, more or less far-reaching,
3. its relations to me (sensuous freshness [*sinnliche Frische*]. Character of feeling).

These [moments] can be thought in several forms: nominal, propositional, attributive." (Loc. cit.)

This characterization of the determinations of an object is a telling example of Daubert's procedure. He takes up a given state of affairs and differentiates it into all its possibilities. In our case, the three moments just indicated are of special importance. The object is regarded as something real and transcendent. In this respect, Daubert spoke of the "transsubjective object". He adopted this term from Johannes Volkelt who spoke of the "transsubjective" as the realm beyond my consciousness.[31] The object's traits are also transcendent. In addition, the real object is connected with other objects, and the Ego is considered in the manner in which it approaches the object. All the above three moments of determination can be regarded in the following three ways: nominally, propositionally, and attributively. In his concept of object Daubert connected the subjective features with objective, logical ones. A real object is given by acts, but at the same time the independence of its existence from the acts which grasp it is emphasized. In this manner, Daubert took an intermediate position between Husserl's "phenomenology of acts" in the *Logical Investigations* and Geiger's "phenomenology of objects".

The objective tendency in Daubert's phenomenology leads to an accentuation of the unity of the object. The object is the a priori substrate or bearer of determinations. "That which is phenomenological is nothing more than the object as well as its different modifications and elements which interact with one another" (5/95v). The unity and essence of an object are independent of consciousness. The unity of object indicates an object in "absolute signification" (5/109v). The unity of the object was delineated by Daubert in three aspects: the unity of the concretum, the unity of the states of affairs, and the categorial unity of forms. Daubert discussed the unity of the concretum with Husserl. He characterized this unity as existence at a fixed point in space and time. Husserl admitted "the imperfection of his investigations" (5/110v) in this respect to Daubert and added that, for instance, the uninterrupted juxtaposition of photographs of a thing does not yet result in the view of the thing itself. Husserl here gives a vivid example of adumbration (*Abschattung*). Daubert, on the other hand, stressed the unity of the object prior to all acts of identification. For that reason, he distinguishes the objective unity of the object from the consciousness of objects as a subjective element.

The consciousness of objects is independent of the object itself. There are non-existent objects, for example objects of phantasy. In

these cases the consciousness of objects exists, but the object does not. By means of consciousness the Ego directs itself to the transcendent object. The consciousness of an object shows the object in its intuitive fullness and with significative elements. Daubert pointed out a double significance of Husserl's concept of intention (5/106r). On the one hand, intention means "plain consciousness", i.e. the intuition of an object. On the other hand, it means "interest in the being-so or presence" of an object. Both significations are directed to different aspects of the object. We intentionally relate to a red object. Besides, Husserl differentiated the sensed red from the red adumbrated through the sensed red. Daubert argued it is not possible to distinguish phenomenologically between the objective red and the sensed red. Referring only to consciousness is misleading, for "in truth I never have such a criterion as to what belongs to consciousness, and what belongs to the conscious object." (5/95v)

In a lecture on "Object and Consciousness of Objects" (1/15-19), given in 1907, Daubert emphasized the difference between the two. The concept of object is a correlative concept. For Husserl also objectivity is the correlate of an act (LU II, p. 377). Daubert discussed this notion with Husserl (5/109v) and distinguished a threefold correlation: "object and consciousness of objects", "object and sensuous contents", and "object and appearance" (5/86r). Equally, the object as a bearer of determinations and the object in relations are correlates. In this lecture Daubert restricted himself to the first three correlations indicated. The consciousness of objects is borne by the Ego. In this regard, Daubert reproached Husserl for having misunderstood the problems of the Ego; Daubert said that "the 'Ego' can only be the phenomenological primary element".[32] He opposed Husserl's identification of consciousness and the Ego.[33]

The object is represented by the consciousness of objects. Representants can once again become objects, namely, when there are representants of representants, as with signals, for example. Husserl agreed with Daubert on this and added that objects can be explained by analyzing the relationship of founding (5/110r). Inquiry about representation of real things leads to a further differentiation of the concept of object. For instance, a certain part of an object is constantly seen in a given field of vision. Husserl called this "originary status of an object" (*primitive Gegenstandssetzung*), but Daubert the "originary object" (5/104r, cf. 5/124r). Husserl underlined the subjective orienta-

tion of phenomenology; Daubert in turn stressed its objective orientation within a subjective mode of inquiry.

Daubert analyzed Husserl's concept of matter (*Materie*) in the same way. An act relates to an object via matter. The matter constitutes not only real objects, but also possible ones. In the latter cases, the objects do not exist, but the corresponding matter does (5/118r). Daubert moreover distinguished between several meanings of 'matter' in Husserl: 1. "the phenomenological object", which is the object that is present in an act; 2. the intuitive concrete components and significative transcending meantness, and 3. the signification (*Bedeutung*) or concept (5/95v), how I mean an object. The latter distinction leads to the relation of signification and object in Husserl.

Daubert had extensively annotated the beginning of the First Investigation in his own copy. He criticized Husserl as having in mind only existing objects when distinguishing between signification and object. In the same way Husserl did not consider that there are also possible objects, and by this, possible significations, too. In his personal copy Daubert commented on Husserl's threefold distinction of the concept of content in its objective respect: 1. signification, 2. fulfilling sense, and 3. object (LU II, p. 52). About that Daubert wrote: "Yet, this is phenomenologically incorrect. Content is always phenomenological 1. or 2., while 3. is transcendent and thereby never content." Several different concepts of phenomenology become evident through this comment. Husserl had distinguished between the objective and the subjective senses of content, calling the latter "phenomenological, descriptive psychological, empirical-real". Daubert, nevertheless, rejected this concept of phenomenology because it is connected with psychologism, as we will soon see. For Daubert, phenomenology has to do only with the senses 1. and 2., what Husserl calls the "objective sense" of content. The object is transcendent and, therefore, no theme for phenomenological inquiry for Husserl. Here Daubert certainly went beyond Husserl, but his criticism still remains faithful to him, because, like Husserl, he understood phenomenology as a doctrine of essences though not as descriptive psychology. This critical attitude toward Husserl also became evident in the conversations he had together with Reinach in the summer term of 1905. They both objected that in the *Logical Investigations* Husserl had described many things concerning the object by reflecting on the signification. Daubert elucidated this point by considering the example of the relation of similarity (*Ähnlich-*

keitsrelation). This relation changes when objects change, but it is not for that reason founded by the signification of objects.[34] Daubert noted that "Husserl directly admits this and says that he has come to this inaccurate way of expression because of his mathematical interest." (5/95r)

In another conversation Daubert and Reinach drew Husserl's attention to a further topic concerning the relation of object and signification. Contrary to Husserl, they said if I think, for example, of Kaiser Wilhelm, who was the son of Kaiser Friedrich III and the grandson of Queen Victoria, the object "Kaiser Wilhelm" does not imply the significations "the son of Kaiser Friedrich III" and "the grandson of Queen Victoria" (loc. cit., cf. LU II, p. 376 f., and 5/57r). Further, Daubert distinguished the object as "the purely and simply meant in the signification of the word (phenomenological object)", and "the object as substrate of all those determinations" (5/95r).

Daubert preferred to speak of the "real object" instead of "sensuous empirical object" in contrast to a possible one. This real object belongs to what he called "real reality" (*wirkliche Wirklichkeit*) (5/81v). For Daubert, this seemingly tautological expression is justified because it helps to separate reality from "merely intended reality". Subsequently, the term "real reality" came to be used frequently in Munich Phenomenology. Husserl also used this expression.[35] Before this, the earliest reference can be found in Pfänder's posthumous papers, in his notes on Lipps' lectures on "Logic" of 6 December 1899, where he speaks of "real reality which is not alloted to subject" (*Pfänderiana* J 8). Thus, Lipps once again seems to have been the first one to use a formulation which became current in later phenomenological thought.

In addition to the concepts of object already treated, Daubert identified others, namely, "object of higher order or state of affairs," "object of my pointing," and "object of my interest, [i.e.] predicate-meaning (*Prädikatsmeinung*)" (5/117r, cf. 5/115r). These distinctions have no analogues in the *Logical Investigations*.

In contrast, Daubert agreed with Husserl's rejection of the idea of "the thing in itself". Husserl told Daubert, "We could only speak of things insofar as they would be *possible* objects of our consciousness" (5/110v). A thing in itself is no theme for phenomenology, since for fundamental reasons it cannot be grasped by consciousness.

2.3 *Psychologism in Husserl's thinking*

Daubert and Husserl both rejected psychologism. But this did not prevent Daubert from examining Husserl's phenomenology more closely in this respect. Daubert first became aware of psychologism as a problem through his reading of the *Prolegomena to Pure Logic*. In his 1902 lecture "On the Psychology of Apperception and Judgment" he contrasted Husserl's phenomenology with psychologism (see 1.3). Anticipating a term from Husserl's late philosophy, Daubert labelled Lipps' philosophy "transcendental psychologism" (4/23r, cf. Hua XVII, 257 ff.). Daubert's criticism concerning Lipps' "transcendental psychologism" was based on his objection that Lipps did not distinguish carefully enough between the "pure" and the "empirical" Ego.

It is at first glance astonishing that Daubert disapproved of Husserl at different places in his personal copy of the *Logical Investigations* with the exclamation "psychologism!". Ludwig Busse was the first to publicly accuse Husserl of psychologism in his review of LU in 1903.[36] Hans Cornelius also spoke of Husserl's psychologism.[37] And in retrospect Martin Heidegger confessed that for him some difficulties were raised in this regard by studying §9 of the Fifth Investigation.[38] Husserl himself rejected this reproach of having relapsed into psychologism in the second volume of the *Logical Investigations*.[39] Yet, Daubert differs from the other interpreters of Husserl in not merely reproaching him with psychologism in a general way, but in elaborating his charge in detail. Daubert's reproach always occurs in places where Husserl's mode of expression is psychological or nearly so. In the beginning of §9 of the First Investigation Husserl stated that his procedure is that of a "psychological description". Daubert underlined this formulation and noted, "psychologism". In doing so, he wanted to radically separate phenomenology and descriptive psychology. In 1903, Husserl publicly retracted his equation of phenomenology with descriptive psychology (cf. Hua XXII, 206 f.). From the outset, however, Daubert wished to avoid any confusion between the two. For that reason it is understandable that he repeated this accusation when it came to problems of signification. Daubert was determined to purify the *Logical Investigations* of subjectivistic elements, precisely in order to let subjectivity become the foundation of phenomenology. This is why he underlined the following statement of Husserl's in this way: "Reflexion *on* dual faceted *acts* brings then to view, whether essential differences exist or

not in the manner in which *they take place*." (LU II, p. 108) Daubert noted, "Here still wholly and distinctly psychologism!" Reflection on acts as psychic processes is regarded as "psychologistic" by Daubert, since acts should be described phenomenologically in their essence. This is also the reason for his massive reproach of psychologism in the beginning of the Fifth Investigation. Daubert commented on Husserl's interpretation of "acts of signifying" or "experiences of signifying" (LU II, p. 322 and p. 323) by writing "psychologism!", and "that is really psychologism!". Daubert was convinced of the ideality of signification in Husserl's sense. Acts of signifying found (*fundieren*) these idealities, as Husserl had explained. But Daubert did not consider these acts as psychic experiences (5/100r). Acts are here relevant only in respect of their essentiality and not in their psychic singularization.

Daubert's reproach of psychologism aims at avoiding certain weak points in Husserl's argument. But Daubert also defends Husserl against unjustified accusations of psychologism. In his presentation of the concept of evidence developed in Heim's book *Psychologism or Anti-psychologism?*[40] Daubert stated: "The fundamental mistake which runs through all the interpretations of Husserl is the psychologistic and metaphysical (ontological) interpretation. The ideality of signification is fundamentally misunderstood, when it is interpreted as a real thing." (5/155r) The ideality of signification is basic; therefore, evidence should not be understood as psychologistic-subjectivistic, but as something phenomenological.

2.4 *The problem of evidence*

Like Husserl, Daubert rejected the interpretation of evidence as a feeling of evidence. To him, this conception is "pure psychologism" (1/50r). Daubert's widely ramified analysis of evidence was provoked by §39 of the Sixth Investigation, which is extensively annotated in his personal copy.

Daubert distinguished a fourfold concept of evidence:

"I. Insight into essential connections and all evidence which is characterized by pecularities of inner inconsistency and its counterpart, inner belongingness to a unity (apodictic judgments)." (5/124r) Evidence as insight results from adequation of "significationally fixed objects" with "fixations" (loc. cit.). The term "fixation" (*Fixation*) is

peculiar to Daubert. It means the precise intellectual formulation (*Fassung*) of a concept. With the help of fixations, e.g., contradictions can be exposed.

"II. Evidence as statement of matters of fact (*Tatsachenkonstatierung*)." (Loc. cit.) Conceptual fixations and matters of fact become assimilated such that grades of adequation come to light.

"III. Evidence in the statement of apperceptive wholes, for example things, relations etc." (Loc. cit.) This presupposes evidence in the second sense of the term. This kind of evidence is directed to the unity of objects. This unity of things is transcendent and given beforehand to consciousness (see 2.2).

"IV. Evidence of something psychic." (Loc. cit.) This corresponds to Husserl's second concept of consciousness in LU (II, pp. 332 ff.), but in this connection Daubert made a distinction between experiences and "the primary Ego". With this, he departed from Husserl (see 2.2). This kind of evidence is grasped by acts of reflexion. In the case of experiences further removed in time, it is replaced by memory. Therefore, Daubert asked in a letter to Husserl of May 1904: what certainty do we have hereof?[41] Daubert saw no possibility of arriving at clear cognitions with the help of memory; for there are no exact fixations possible in this case.

Daubert summed up this interpretation of problems of evidence by stating that evidence does not at all depend on "simple statement (*Konstatierung*) and grades of probability" in the four concepts of evidence, but rather "on rigorous evidence as such" (loc. cit.).

A further concept of evidence which Daubert discussed with Husserl belongs to this context. He remarked that evidence of logical axioms differs from that of sensuous objects. With regard to the latter, full adequation is possible only in "completely restricted cases" (5/81r). This corresponds with Husserl's first concept of evidence (LU II, p. 504 f.). Considering evidence of axioms, however, Daubert asked Husserl, "What is it that is here intuitively grasped in adequation?" (5/110r) Husserl's answer was: "The law of thinking under consideration is given in adequation or intuitively grasped, when it is not significatively meant or designated, but when I really do perform the act of thinking designated in the law exactly as it is meant in it." (Loc. cit.) Daubert was not content with this answer and pointed to the distinction between axioms as such and the acts of thinking by which I became aware of these axioms. Evidence in this case is indirectly given through the cir-

cumstance that not heeding the logical axioms leads to contradictions (5/81r and 5/110r). Daubert was convinced that this circumstance cannot be explained by Husserl's concept of evidence. For that reason he referred to the difference in fulfilment between thinking of axioms and of the "intuitively grasped red" (5/110r). While Daubert did not himself use the expression "categorial representation" (cf. LU II, pp. 637 ff.), this problem does remain in the background. He does want to show that the representations of categorial and sensuous objects must be more finely differentiated, as Husserl did. In the second edition of LU, Husserl himself was no longer satisfied with his solution of the problem of categorial representation (cf. Hua XIX, 535). This may well have resulted from his discussions with Daubert.

2.5 *The phenomenology of questions*

The letter of Dr. Fritz Weinmann to Daubert on Husserl's discussion of questions in the Sixth Investigation, Chap. 9, is a further proof that Daubert was regarded in Munich as an authority on Husserl's phenomenology. In 1904, Weinmann completed his doctorate under Lipps with his dissertation *Zur Struktur der Melodie* (*On the Structure of Melody*). He studied together with Daubert in Göttingen in the summer term of 1905 and took part in the "Seefeld Conversations" of the same year.[42] Daubert's reply to Weinmann of 28 December 1904, a draft of which has survived, consists of two parts (5/83). At the beginning Daubert gave his views concerning Weinmann's questions and replied to them with an interpretation of Husserl's text. In the second part he criticized Husserl's analysis of the problems of questions. Weinmann had asked, "Whether acts of questioning are judgments about objectivating acts, and [further] how we can understand the circumstance that objectivating acts themselves become objective?" (5/83r) In his answer Daubert first pointed to Husserl's distinction between objectivating and non-objectivating acts, and explained that the latter receive their signification and founding through objectivating acts (cf. LU II, pp. 461 ff. and 679 ff.). Then he described Husserl's statement of this problem in §69 of the Sixth Investigation (cf. 2/73 and 5/45). Husserl rejects the Aristotelian conception that the signification of a question becomes immediately apparent in the utterance of a question. According to Husserl, this implies a bifurcation within the bearer of the

signification. Contrary to Aristotle, Husserl holds that objectivating acts as bearers of the signification lie at the basis of questions, and that non-objectivating acts are fundamentally "particularizations" of objectivating acts. Moreover, Daubert quoted Weinmann's question, "'When I ask if A is B, I do not reflect at the same time on my experiences.'" (5/83v) To this, Daubert responded by referring to Husserl's arguments in the paragraph already quoted. One has to distinguish the formulation of a question and its statement. The statement of a question takes place in objectivating acts, which equally found (*fundieren*) significations. After this sketch Daubert wrote: "Concerning the above-mentioned question, Husserl's arguments do not convince me. First of all, I do not see why there should be an alternative in the sense that either only objectivating acts or acts of every other genus could function as signification-bestowing acts." (Loc. cit.) By this Daubert rejected the dominance of objectivating acts. Questions, wishes etc. as acts were to him objectivating acts of equal value. He acknowledged their special epistemological status which he characterized as follows: "The 'being-in-a-mood' (*Zumutesein*) – our language has no more precise word for it –[43] in feelings is distinctly distinguished as a peculiar knowledge of my experiences from a present knowledge by reflexion on them, i.e. from objectivating acts." (Loc. cit.) "Being-in-a-mood", thus, is a pre-reflexive and non-intentional mode of knowledge of feelings and questions. In this way Daubert broke through Husserl's intentional phenomenology. He further criticized Husserl with the remark: "It seems to me that Husserl continuously misjudges the peculiarity of this consciousness in the 'being-in-a-mood'." (Loc. cit.) This objection is not without relevance, because Husserl himself had spoken of "being-in-a-mood" as a peculiarity of acts (LU II, p. 361, cf. p. 497). Daubert quoted (5/93v and 5/96v) and annotated that passage repeatedly. But it remains true that Husserl did not attach as much importance to this idea of being-in-a-mood as Daubert did. Therefore, Daubert wished to regard questions and other non-objectivating acts as having the same value as objectivating acts. So the problem of questions became a further point of disagreement with Husserl.

Daubert discussed the problem of questions with Husserl in their conversations of 1-3 October 1906. The starting point of their conversation was "the old question, whether acts other than objectivating ones could also function as signification-conferring acts." (5/153v) First, Daubert described Husserl's "old version" in the *Logical Investi-*

gations. Then he asked if acts must always be an "objective grasping", referring to questions or wishes. Finally, Daubert told Husserl that there is a sort of relating to acts, which is an "inner, lively feeling (*Spüren*)" (loc. cit.). This feeling is not yet an objective grasping. Husserl replied that this must lead to an infinite regress. Afterwards Daubert stated that Husserl "thus once again misunderstood feeling according to the old scheme: consciousness-of." (Loc. cit.) From this statement one gathers that Daubert meant by "feeling" "being-in-a-mood". "Feeling" or "being-in-a-mood" are non-intentional. Daubert summed up: "Here, Husserl spoke of a matter of wish (*Wunschverhalt*) resp. matter of question (*Frageverhalt*) etc. as being something special. Consequently, the respective objectivating act, e.g., which grasps and expresses the matter of question, would no longer be an objectivating act grasping the state of affairs of my desire." (Loc. cit.) Nevertheless, Husserl retained his earlier view on the nature of questions in the second edition of the *Logical Investigations*. At the same time, he emphasized in the preface to the second edition that shortly after the first edition of his work he changed his position concerning the problems of phenomenological interpretation of questions and wishes (cf. Hua XIX, 536).[44] This could be a hint of his conversations with Daubert.

A few years later Daubert took up these problems anew. In 1912, when Husserl was putting together the first volume of his *Jahrbuch*, he tried to induce Daubert to work with him. Daubert wanted to write an extensive article on the problem of questions for the *Jahrbuch*, and he worked on this during the years 1911 and 1912. However, he did not succeed in finishing these studies. His drafts are now in *Daubertiana* A I 2 "*Frage*". Daubert intended to examine "the phenomenology of questions" and "the phenomenology of questioning". In this connection, in a conversation with Pfänder on 15 April 1911, he remarked that Husserl's concept of objectivating act was unsuitable for subsuming wishes and questions under it (2/43r). Daubert stated that questions and questioning as acts were different. He distinguished questions from judgments, wishes, and commands. Questions have their own significations and are independent of objectivating acts. Daubert repeated what he had written to Weinmann in 1904 and had discussed with Husserl in 1906. Finally, the phenomenology of questions and of questioning led Daubert to other phenomenological fundamentals differing from Husserl's phenomenology.

2.6 *Daubert's criticism of Husserl's concept of phenomenology*

Besides examining Husserl's *Logical Investigations* in detail, Daubert also dealt with it in his meditations on the foundations of phenomenology. It is noteworthy that the only phenomenologist quoted in these manuscripts is Husserl. At the end of the manuscript "*The Possible Determinations (Bestimmungen) of Phenomenology*" (1/4r),[45] Daubert wrote that phenomenology as doctrine of essences should "supersede rationalism or, even better, restrict it to its formal realm, which is nothing but a special case of phenomenology." From this we can see the importance Daubert ascribed to phenomenology, and how according to him phenomenology is able to integrate other philosophical modes of inquiry. He concluded by saying that "Husserl, who proceeded from rationalism, restricted himself to the above [i.e. doctrine of essences] and Husserl himself also regarded this as rationalistic." Daubert apparently had in mind Husserl's remark that his relationship to Leibniz was "relatively of the closest" (Hua XVIII, 222). On the other hand, Daubert considered rationalism as being philosophically justified only after it had received a phenomenological foundation. With regard to rationalism, Husserl's self-criticism could refer to one of his conversations with Daubert.

In §25 of the Sixth Investigation Husserl asks about the relationship between the matter of an act and its signification. He states that the matter alone is not the signification, because otherwise in the predicative statement one excludes "the moment of actual *asserting* from signification" (LU II, p. 559). Daubert commented on this in a marginal note in his personal copy: "What are the qualities of asserting etc. doing in the sphere of significations? Here rationalism is left behind." Asserting something is a psychological act and fact. Husserl in this respect transcends rationalism, because actual asserting should itself contain an ideal element. But Daubert regarded this way of overcoming rationalism as not yet a sufficient answer.

Daubert agreed with Husserl on the ideality of signification. Categorial intuition was also for him a task of phenomenology (cf. 1/45r and 11/18r). Rationalism should be integrated into phenomenology, but the rejection of rationalism may lead to psychologism, which Daubert absolutely wanted to avoid. Thus, while reflecting upon Husserl's analysis of categorial representation as "the psychic bond which is experienced in *actual* identifying or collecting, etc." (LU II,

p. 645) Daubert noted: "That is deduced simply for the sake of analogy. This goes completely beyond phenomenology. It is simply dictated: there *must* be a representant for all that can be objectively meant." Here Daubert related to a central problem in Husserl's doctrine of categorial representation (see 2.4). He regarded Husserl's statement as transcending phenomenology. Therefore, he pointed out that the *Logical Investigations* are not without any presuppositions, although Husserl is convinced of the opposite.

Contrary to Husserl (cf. LU II, p. 327), Daubert argued "the [objective] moment of red cannot be distinguished from the sensory-content of red, but surely my state of volition [is distinguishable] from the character of what is desired." (5/93r) With reference to Husserl's phenomenology he said, "If givenness is regarded as an act, and if feelings etc. are readily designated as act-qualities, then this point of view is not without any presuppositions." (Loc. cit.) Daubert is concerned with the question, whether Husserl's phenomenology takes certain assumptions for granted that remain phenomenologically unexplained. Generally speaking, how can a phenomenological grounding of phenomenology be reached without leading to an infinite regress or lapsing into a methodical circle? Daubert wanted to escape this circle by referring to the being-in-a-mood as a prereflexive type of knowledge. He noted: "It seems to me that *Husserl* argues in a circle: why is an experience intentional? Because it phenomenologically exhibits the differences between matter, object etc. How do we recognize that an experience allows for these distinctions? *Husserl* [answers] : because it is something specifically phenomenological. But the peculiar character of phenomenology cannot be given by references to structure, but rather only by pointing to a characteristic being-in-a-mood." (5/122r) Daubert here anticipates a current criticism of Husserl which accuses him of not having explained why consciousness is intentional at all.[46] Daubert was not satisfied with the assertion of intentionality, but he pointed to a way out of this phenomenological difficulty. In being-in-a-mood we experience the essence of acts. Herewith, we can distinguish between objectivating acts and non-objectivating ones. Being-in-a-mood makes us aware of questions, feelings, and values.[47] Consequently, being-in-a-mood is the phenomenological authority for avoiding a circle in the foundations of phenomenology. This being-in-a-mood is a prereflexive mode of knowledge and does not yield "significational fixations" (5/124r). It is self-grounding and serves further to ground rationalism. Daubert explained

the relation between phenomenology and rationalism by founding the rationalistic element in phenomenology by means of the prepredicative being-in-a-mood.

Daubert's concept of being-in-a-mood might well remind one of Heidegger's and Bollnow's concept of "*Stimmung*" ("mood").[48] Yet, there are some differences. Daubert is neither a hermeneutic nor a transcendental philosopher. His "being-in-a-mood" and "feeling" are to be understood as prereflexive source of cognition. For that reason Daubert is not a psychologist, but a phenomenologist.

Daubert criticized Husserl for not having taken into account this being-in-a-mood. But at the same time Daubert used the genuine Husserlian concept of intentionality. In Daubert's thinking there are simultaneously different strata of phenomenology. Daubert did not realize that he coincidently is a follower as well as a critic of Husserl. Daubert's relation to Husserl is as ambivalent as is his relation to Theodor Lipps.

3. Final remarks

If one asks why Husserl had such a high regard for Daubert, one may safely state that Daubert was doubtlessly the best authority on the *Logical Investigations* in the beginning of this century. The thoroughness of Daubert's knowledge of this work stands out from that of pretended Husserl critics. Husserl himself was stimulated by him to reconsider certain analyses contained in his work. He spoke of "Pfänder-Daubert difficulties" which led to his discovery of the phenomenological reduction.[49] He also discussed with Daubert this new method of phenomenological reduction as transcending the point of view of his *Logical Investigations* (cf. 5/153r and 5/154r). Daubert himself matured into an independent phenomenologist through the conversations with Husserl and the analyses of Husserl's writings.

Daubert had planned to write his doctoral thesis on the topic of consciousness of reality. For this purpose he also prepared drafts of various manuscripts, along with his analyses of the *Logical Investigations*. He informed Husserl about his plan and its failure in the years 1904 and 1905. Seven years later, Daubert reported to Husserl that he could not complete his article for the opening issue of the *Jahrbuch*. Husserl answered that Daubert was too self-critical.[50] That was indeed

the reason why Daubert never finished a work for publication. He mainly stimulated others; therefore, he can be regarded as the "Socrates" of Munich Phenomenology. Like Husserl, Daubert intended to help philosophy becomes scientific. According to both Daubert and Husserl, this can only be accomplished by phenomenology. Thus, phenomenology is the foundation of philosophy. For that reason, one may say that the core of Daubert's philosophical intentions is contained in his dictum: "In all thinking the phenomenological standpoint is implied." (1/35r)[51]

NOTES

1. Max Scheler, "Die deutsche Philosophie der Gegenwart: Zusätze aus den nachgelassenen Manuskripten", in Manfred S. Frings, ed., *Gesammelte Werke*, Vol. 7 (Bern und München: A. Francke, 1973), p. 328. – All translations are mine.
2. In 1967, Professor Herbert Spiegelberg arranged for Daubert's posthumous papers to be deposited in the Bavarian State Library in Munich. After that the papers were classified and catalogued by Dr. Eberhard Avé-Lallemant (see his *Die Nachlässe der Münchener Phänomenologen in der Bayerischen Staatsbibliothek* (Catalogus codicum scriptorum Bibliothecae Monacensis, tomus X, pars I) (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1975), pp. 125-138). In 1976, Prof. Schuhmann succeeded in deciphering Daubert's shorthand. From 1979 to 1983, the State University of Utrecht funded a research project under the supervision of Prof. Schuhmann for the transcription of and the research into Daubert's manuscripts. Cf. my article "Zwei Briefe von Johannes Daubert an Edmund Husserl aus dem Jahr 1907", *Husserl Studies* 1 (1984), pp. 143 ff. The present paper too results from this research project.
3. Quoted from Karl Schuhmann, *Husserl-Chronik: Denk- und Lebensweg Edmund Husserls*, Husserliana Dokumente, Vol. I (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), p. 72.
4. Herbert Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction*, Phaenomenologica 5/6 (The Hague/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982[3]), p. 169.
5. Moritz Geiger, "Alexander Pfänders methodische Stellung", in E. Heller and F. Löw, eds., *Neue Münchener Philosophische Abhandlungen: Alexander Pfänder zum sechzigsten Geburtstag* (Leipzig: Johannes Abrosius Barth, 1933), p. 4.
6. *Daubertiana* A II 3, note-book *Psychologica*, p. 91. The term "phenomenological" occurs also on pages 64 and 70 of this note-book.
7. See Theodor Lipps, "Psychische Vorgänge und psychische Causalität", *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane* 25 (1901), pp. 161 ff. This article was received by the editors on 19 December 1900.
8. Theodor Lipps, "Inhalt und Gegenstand; Psychologie und Logik", in *Sitzungsberichte der philosophisch-philologischen und der historischen Klasse der K.B. Akademie der Wissenschaften*. Vol. 1905 (München: K.B. Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1906), p. 556. Lipps strangely does not discuss Hegel in this context, although he clearly adopts this expression from him.
9. For some preliminary information about this see my article "'Münchener Phänomenologie': Zur Frühgeschichte des Begriffs", in H. Spiegelberg and E. Avé-Lallemant, eds., *Pfänder-Studien*, Phaenomenologica 84 (The Hague/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), pp. 116 ff.

10. Cf. Theodor Lipps, "Fortsetzung der 'Psychologischen Streitpunkte'", *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane* 31 (1903), p. 78. This article was received by the editors on 20 October 1902.
11. The lecture is in *Daubertiana* A I 4/1-15. – Quotations from the *Daubertiana* manuscripts are given in the text by referring to file, page number, and recto-/verso-markings. Quotations from *Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Theil: Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis* (Halle a.S.: Max Niemeyer, 1901) are abbreviated: LU II. – In 1984, a new critical edition of this text edited by Ursula Panzer was published as Hua XIX.
12. Leipzig: W. Engelmann, 1902. In the same year there appeared Karl Heim's book *Psychologismus oder Antipsychologismus? Entwurf einer erkenntnistheoretischen Fundamentierung der modernen Energetik* (Berlin: C.A. Schwetschke und Sohn, 1902). According to its preface, this work was finished in October 1902. So Daubert could not refer to it in these manuscripts which were written in July of that year.
13. H. Spiegelberg, loc. cit.
14. Quoted from K. Schuhmann, "Ein Brief Husserls an Theodor Lipps", *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie* 39 (1977), p. 141 f.
15. Cf. K. Schuhmann, *Husserl-Chronik*, p. 81; and his work, *Husserl über Pfänder*, Phaenomenologica 56 (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), pp. 20 ff.
16. Hans Büttner, "Die phänomenologische Psychologie Alexander Pfänders", *Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie* 94 (1935), p. 317.
17. See K. Schuhmann, *Husserl über Pfänder*, p. 17.
18. Cf. E. Avé-Lallemant, *Die Nachlässe der Münchener Phänomenologen in der Bayerischen Staatsbibliothek*, p. 16.
19. Hans Cornelius, "Psychologische Prinzipienfragen", *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane. I. Abteilung. Zeitschrift für Psychologie* 42 (1906), p. 401.
20. Cf. my article "'Münchener Phänomenologie': Zur Frühgeschichte des Begriffe", p. 123 f.
21. See Moritz Geiger, *Methodologische und experimentelle Beiträge zur Quantitätslehre* (Leipzig: Wilhelm Engelmann, 1906), p. 31, note 1 (cf. p. IV) = "Methodologische und experimentelle Beiträge zur Quantitätslehre", *Psychologische Untersuchungen* 1 (1907), p. 355, note 1.
22. Reinach's letters to Conrad are in the Bavarian State Library in Munich (*Conradiana* B II: Reinach; cf. E. Avé-Lallemant, loc. cit., p. 169). Copies of them lie in the Husserl archives in Louvain, Belgium.
23. Theodor Conrad's copy of Daubert's letter lies in *Conradiana* B II: Daubert (cf. E. Avé-Lallemant, loc. cit.).
24. Cf. *Conradiana* B II: Reinach and *Conradiana* A V 1 (cf. E. Avé-Lallemant, loc. cit., pp. 166 and 169).
25. H. Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement*, p. 233.
26. K. Schuhmann, *Husserl-Chronik*, p. 89.
27. See Elmar Holenstein, "Einleitung des Herausgebers", in Hua XVIII, XXXVII; and H. Spiegelberg, *The Context of the Phenomenological Movement*, Phaenomenologica 80 (The Hague/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), p. 108 f. and p. 116, note 4.
28. Cf. H. Spiegelberg, loc. cit., pp. 130 ff.
29. See Daubert's draft for a letter to Husserl of August 1907, which I published in: "Zwei Briefe von Johannes Daubert an Edmund Husserl aus dem Jahr 1907", loc. cit.; quotation p. 150. Brentano himself wrote about the conversations with Daubert in a letter to Hugo Bergmann, in which he called Daubert Husserl's "main defender (*Hauptverfechter*)" in Munich, cf. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 7 (1946/47), p. 96.

30. Cf. K. Schuhmann, loc. cit., pp. 155 and 183; and Ursula Panzer, "Einleitung der Herausgeberin", in Hua XIX, XXII ff.
31. See *Daubertiana* 5/118r cf. 5/126r. On Volkelt's concept of the "transsubjective" cf. *Erfahrung und Denken: Kritische Grundlegung der Erkenntnistheorie* (Hamburg und Leipzig: Leopold Voss, 1886), pp. 42, 139 ff., 159 ff., 188 ff. and 542 f.
32. See *Daubertiana* A I 5/120r; 5/82r, 5/97v, and 5/124r.
33. Cf. my dissertation *'Mein reines Ich' und die Probleme der Subjektivität: Eine Studie zum Anfang der Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls* (Phil. Diss. Köln, 1978), pp. 20 ff.
34. On the "relation of similarity" cf. *Daubertiana* A I 1/24-29. See also my article "Ähnlichkeit als Thema der Münchener Lipps-Schule", *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 37 (1983), pp. 606 ff.
35. Cf. K. Schuhmann, *Husserl über Pfänder*, p. 140.
36. Cf. Ludwig Busse, "Rezension: Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen", *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane* 33 (1903), pp. 153 ff.
37. Cf. H. Cornelius, "Psychologische Prinzipienfragen", p. 406.
38. Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Zur Sache des Denkens* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1969), p. 83.
39. Cf. my dissertation *'Mein reines Ich' und die Probleme der Subjektivität*, pp. 10 ff. and 44 ff.
40. Cf. K. Heim, *Psychologismus oder Antipsychologismus?*, pp. 17 f. and 53 f.
41. On Husserl's answer to Daubert see K. Schuhmann, *Husserl über Pfänder*, p. 50.
42. Cf. Schuhmann, loc. cit., p. 130.
43. The term *"Zumutesein"* is very difficult to express in English. It means a prereflexive, non-intentional source of cognition. It is a cast of mood which founds (*"fundiert"*) our thinking and feeling, so I have chosen to render it "Being-in-a-mood".
44. In his article "Husserl and the Logic of Questions", *Analecta Husserliana* 14 (1983), p. 387, C. Struyker Boudier quotes this statement of Husserl, but he is not aware of the fact that there are some problems in interpreting Husserl which can only be solved by probing into new sources of Husserl's thinking, such as Johannes Daubert's notes. Günther Pöltner does not take Husserl into account in his study *Zu einer Phänomenologie des Fragens: Ein fragend-fraglicher Versuch* Symposion 37 (Freiburg/München: Karl Alber, 1972). Pöltner is not able to fulfill the expectations which he evokes by this rather pretentious title.
45. This manuscript is reproduced in E. Avé-Lallemant, *Die Nachlässe der Münchener Phänomenologen in der Bayerischen Staatsbibliothek*, p. 132. On the interpretation of the manuscript cf. my article "'Münchener Phänomenologie': Zur Frühgeschichte des Begriffs", pp. 131 ff.
46. On Husserl's concept of intentionality and his critics cf. J.N. Mohanty, "Husserl's Concept of Intentionality", *Analecta Husserliana* 1 (1971), pp. 100 ff.
47. Cf. *Daubertiana* 5/83v, 5/95v, 5/96r, 5/98r, 5/122, and 5/124r.
48. Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, §§ 29, 30; Otto Friedrich Bollnow, *Das Wesen der Stimmungen* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1980[6]).
49. Cf. K. Schuhmann, *Husserl über Pfänder*, pp. 162 ff.
50. Husserl's letters to Daubert are in the Husserl archives in Louvain, Belgium. Copies of them lie in the Bavarian State Library in Munich (*Daubertiana* B II: Husserl; cf. E. Avé-Lallemant, loc. cit., p. 136).
51. Cf. K. Schuhmann, "Structuring the Phenomenological Field: Reflections on a Daubert Manuscript", in W.S. Hamrick ed., *Phenomenology in Practice and Theory* Phaenomenologica 92 (Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985), pp. 3 ff.